

Varieties of Populism in Europe, 2002-2017

MARCO R. STEENBERGEN

University of Zurich

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Abstract

Populism has been described as a thin ideology, meaning that it can adhere to many views of the desired political order. While scholars generally recognise that populism can be left, right, or even post-ideological, there are few systematic empirical studies that explore qualitative differences among populist political parties. In this paper, we use data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and machine learning to identify clusters of populist parties based on party ideological positions in Europe. We identify four varieties of populism in Europe for the period 2002-2017: left, centrist, soft, and hard traditionalism-authoritarianism-nationalism (TAN) populism. We correlate the types with information about the issue positions of populist parties.

1 Introduction

Most students of contemporary populism treat the phenomenon as a thin ideology (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mudde, 2004; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2011; Stanley, 2008). Populism, so the argument goes, contains a prescription about the relative roles of elites and the people. Beyond this, however, it is remarkably fluid in its view of the good society. As such, populism can attach itself to a range of thick ideologies.

This view of populism raises the question of which varieties of populism manifest itself in real-world politics. Increasingly, scholars conduct research on the varieties of populism (Calani & Graziano, 2019; Ivaldi, Lanzone, & Woods, 2017; March, 2012; Mudde, 2007; Raadt, Hollanders, & Krouwel, 2004; Tushnet, 2019). The present paper contributes to this literature, focusing on the case of European populism at the party level over a period of fifteen years.

The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, most studies of the varieties of populism among po-

litical parties have focused on a limited number of cases that are studied at a particular time. In this paper, I try to take a comprehensive look at populism across space and time. Not only does this broaden the scope but it also allows for a consideration of within-party shifts in populism.

Second, most studies consider a single dimension that defines the nature of populism such as left-right (Ivaldi et al., 2017) or inclusion versus exclusion (Tushnet, 2019). Political contestation in Europe, however, is a multidimensional affair (Bornschier, 2010; Dalton, 2019; Kitschelt, 2001; Kriesi et al., 2006). When one takes this into account, what varieties of populism emerge?

Third, I attempt to predict the varieties of populism based on the issue positions that parties take. This affords a more fine-grained look than left-right, inclusionary-exclusionary, or other classification schemes. How one views the rise of populism in Europe, after all, depends a great deal on the policies one should expect to see once populist parties come to power.

The paper takes advantage of multiple codings of political parties in terms of their populism, including the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Kessel, 2015; Polk et al., 2017; Rooduijn et al., 2019). In doing so, it offers one of the most comprehensive overviews of populist parties in Europe over the period 1999-2017. The paper uses methods of supervised and unsupervised machine learning to classify and predict populist parties, which also adds a novel element to the literature.

2 Populism and Political Ideology

2.1 Past Research and Its Limitations

Populism is a relational concept (Cassirer, 1910). It criticises the existing relationship between the people and the ruling classes and puts in its place an idealised view of popular sovereignty. Thus, the key actors are elites and people.

In its critique of existing power relations, populism is distinctively anti-elitist. Some view this as *the* defining characteristic of populism (Panizza, 2005; Stanley, 2008) but it may be better to view it as one of two necessary conditions for populism, the other being the emphasis on popular sovereignty. The elites, however they are defined, are the enemies of the people. Mudde (2004, p. 544) calls this dualistic outlook Manichean. The people are considered pure, whereas the elites are considered corrupt. The populist objective is to restore a proper sovereign role for the people (Abts & Rummens, 2007). In the words of Jagers and Walgrave (2007, p. 322), “populism always refers to the people and justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with the people.”

This relational ideal leaves a great deal of room for elaboration. Which elites frustrate the will of the people? Are these political elites or also artists, business leaders, media personalities, scientists, and others? And who are the people? Is this everyone who does not count as an elite or do only certain groups qualify as *the* people? It is in the answer to those questions that populism transforms itself from a thin to a thick ideology.

One common way of distinguishing between varieties of populism qua thick ideology is to distinguish between left and right forms of populism (e.g., Ivaldi et al., 2017; March, 2012; Mudde, 2007). Often the labels “left” and “right” are defined broadly, referencing both economic and other positions. Although it is easy to relate to these terms, their broad definition introduces some ambiguity in how one should understand populism on the left and right poles of the political spectrum.

Another distinction that has been made is between inclusive and exclusive forms of populism (e.g., Tushnet, 2019). Here, the central question is how encompassing one’s definition of the people is. When populism is married to nativist ideologies, then exclusive forms emerge. It is often argued that such forms dominate on the right. By contrast, concep-

tions of the people tend to be inclusive on the left, which pushes an egalitarian ideology. What is unclear about this distinction, however, is how economic cleavages play into populism. We have certainly seen examples of exclusive populist parties that push an egalitarian agenda for their category of the people, as well as ones that take neoliberal economic positions.

In general, it would seem that categories such as “left” versus “right” and “inclusive” versus “exclusive” are too limited to help us grasp the full spectrum of populist political parties. They are too limited because they ultimately rely on unidimensional conceptions of political contestation. We have known for some time, however, that most party systems require multiple dimensions to define the societal conflicts that manifest themselves through party competition. Whether one speaks of old and new politics (Dalton, 2019), cultural and economic divides (Bornschieer, 2010; Kitschelt, 2001), or inclusion/exclusion versus economic conflict (Kriesi et al., 2006), there is consensus that at least two dimensions are needed to understand cleavage structures in Europe. From this perspective, it would seem necessary to build typologies of populism on top of multidimensional conceptions of the political space.

A second problem affects much of the literature on the varieties of populism to date: the limited case selection. Much of what we know about the types of populism that we observe are limited to detailed studies of a few parties observed at a particular juncture. This is understandable: given that populism is a slippery concept (Canovan, 1999), it helps to focus on a few exemplars and assess their ideological qualities in detail. However, by now scholars have done considerable work in developing comprehensive lists of populist parties (Kessel, 2015; Rooduijn et al., 2019) and it is time to explore patterns of populism among a wider range of parties, observed at multiple time points. This has several advantages. First, it affords a degree of generality, although we should keep in mind that even the typology derived in the present paper has a limited geographic and temporal scope. Second, it allows us to determine how widespread various types of populism are. Finally, it is possible to observe the dynamics of populism within political parties over time.

2.2 A New Approach

To overcome the limitations of the literature to date, a new approach is needed. In this paper, I study 137 cases of populist parties. A case, here, is defined as a party observed at a particular point in time. Some parties are observed only once, whereas I have multiple time points for other parties (see Table 1).

I develop the empirical analysis in three steps. First, I use a fuzzy clustering algorithm that allows me to classify populist parties based on two ideological dimensions. The first dimension is an economic left-right divide that reflects conflicts over the distribution of economic goods. The second is the GAL-TAN dimension, which reflects a series of conflicts that tend to correlate strongly and pertain to non-economic issues (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Marks & Wilson, 2000). In the acronym, GAL stands for green-alternative-libertarian, whereas TAN stands for traditional-authoritarian-nationalist. Thus, the dimension captures conflict over life styles, the environment, the scope of the polity, and political freedoms. Using this dimension, as well as an economic dimension, it is possible to obtain a more fine-grained picture of the varieties of populism in Europe between 1999-2017.

In a second step of the analysis, I build profiles of the clusters in terms of a variety of political issues. This fleshes out the different forms that populism has taken in Europe. In a third step, I use random forests to predict cluster membership from the various issues. This further refines our understanding of the varieties of populism that exist.

3 Methods

3.1 Case Selection

The analysis focuses on all of Europe, including Turkey and the Ukraine but excluding Belarus, Moldova, and the Russian Federation due to data limitations.¹ It covers the period 2002-2017, al-

¹Country cases are indicated through two-letter abbreviations: AL = Albania; AT = Austria; BA = Bosnia and Herzegovina; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CH = Switzerland; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; GR = Greece; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IS = Iceland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; ME = Montenegro; MK = North Macedonia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; NO = Norway;

though the specific coverage depends on data availability as well as the longevity of parties.

In classifying parties as populist, we rely on three primary sources: (1) Kessel (2015); (2) popu-list.org (Rooduijn et al., 2019); and (3) the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) series (Polk et al., 2017). Kessel (2015) relied on expert surveys to construct an inventory of populist parties in 31 European countries in the period 2000-2013. The website popu-list.org is an ongoing collaboration between world-renowned populism scholars that seeks to provide regular updates of populism and other party characteristics in Europe. Since 2014, CHES has included populism indicators. In 2014, only the centrality of anti-elitism was measured. In the 2017 flash survey, however, experts were also asked to indicate whether parties would want the main locus of decision-making power to rest with the people. This item can be viewed as a measure of popular sovereignty.²

The first two sources deliver binary indicators of populism: 1 if a party is populist and 0 if it is not. This is not true of the CHES data, which come in the form of ratings. I converted those into binary indicators using the following rule: a party is considered populist if a majority of the experts give a rating of at least 6 (on a 0-10 scale) and if the median expert rating is at least 6. Adding the latter requirement means that a party may fail to be classified if a minority of experts give very low ratings of the party's position on the populism dimensions.

Populism being a complex construct, there is a real risk—especially in the current political climate—to call all sorts of parties populist. The main analyses in this paper assume that a party is populist only if two sources agree that it is. In the appendix, I relax this assumption, which results in more or less the same data patterns, albeit much noisier.

I make one exception to the rule. For Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia, it appears that only CHES data are available. Here, I opted to use a single source, albeit with a stricter requirement on the expert ratings: a party is considered populist if a majority of the experts rate the party at a value of 6 or higher and if the median rating is at least 9.

PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; RS = Serbia; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovakia; TR = Turkey; UA = Ukraine; UK = United Kingdom; XK = Kosovo.

²The two indicators correlate at 0.814 in 2017, giving some confidence to rely solely on anti-elitism in 2014.

Table 1 shows the abbreviations of the parties that are included, as well as the years of coverage.³ Because of the stringent requirement that two sources agree, some countries are indicated to have no populist parties at all.

[Table 1 about here]

3.2 Statistical Techniques

Cluster analysis refers to methods of unsupervised machine learning that allow scholars to find groupings of cases. It is the perfect approach for uncovering varieties of populism. There are many clustering algorithms, but here I rely on a fuzzy k-means clustering technique. In general, k-means clustering finds k clusters around means or centroids. Unlike hierarchical clustering algorithms, k-means clustering has the advantage that cases can be moved continuously from one to the other cluster until the algorithm has converged. Fuzzy clustering adds another benefit, namely that cases are assigned probabilistically to clusters. This means that we allow the same case to belong to multiple clusters, albeit to possibly different degrees. This adds a degree of flexibility in the classification of parties that may do greater justice to the complex nature of populism in Europe.

I base the cluster analysis on two variables: economic left-right and GAL-TAN. Together, these two party attributes span a 2-dimensional space. The cluster analysis then proceeds in three steps. First, we decide on an appropriate model. This means choosing the number of clusters, as well as additional parameters. The fuzzy clustering algorithm that I use assumes k bivariate normal distributions that describe the data. The centroids of those distributions are always estimated. For the remaining parameters of the normal distribution, we decide how they should be parameterised. Should we allow for differential variances along the axes of the 2-dimensional space? Should we allow for correlation between the cluster axes? These questions, as well as the decision about the number of clusters are settled by optimising the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).

Once a model has been selected, the next step is to assign cases to the various clusters through some form of optimal allocation. This results in information about the cluster probabilities, centroids, and other parameters. Finally, we obtain information

about the cluster membership of the cases is obtained in the form of a series of case-specific cluster probabilities. A case is assigned to the cluster with the largest probability. However, it is also possible to indicate the fuzziness of cluster membership. Membership is crisper the more all of the probability mass is concentrated in a single cluster.

In a third step, we then interpret the clusters based on the centroids. There are no hard and fast rules for doing this. Fortunately, the clusters I uncover are quite easily interpreted, as we shall see.

The whole process offers a number of advantages over more ad hoc forms of classification. First, we have a firm criterion for deciding on the number of clusters. Second, cluster allocation is performed in a systematic manner.

I do not stop the analysis here. To provide additional insight into the clusters, I relate cluster membership to a variety of issue positions, derived from CHES. Unfortunately, the full range of issue positions exists only for a subset of the cases used in the cluster analysis, so that the sample size will be much reduced. Nevertheless, we can derive additional insight from these analyses, which essentially identify issue profiles for the clusters. To obtain some sense of variable importance for the various issues, I conclude the analysis by using random forests. This is a method of supervised machine learning that can be used for purposes of classifying cases (Breiman, 2001).

4 Results

4.1 Cluster Analysis

The optimal model specification is one that allows for 4 clusters ($BIC = 60.398$).⁴ Each cluster is characterised by an underlying bivariate normal distribution. In the optimal model specification, the centroids are allowed to vary across the clusters, as are the variances along the economic left-right and GAL-TAN axes. Although one could allow those dimensions to be correlated, the optimal model restricts the correlation to be zero. Thus, the dimensions are orthogonal to each other within each cluster.

[Figure 1 about here]

³Section 6.1 shows the full party names (in English) of the parties included in the main analysis.

⁴In the algorithm, BIC is an approximation of the integrated likelihood. We choose the model with the highest integrated likelihood, i.e., the largest BIC.

Figure 1 shows the cluster solution. We observe two clusters with very little overlap and two with considerably more overlap. The cluster at the bottom left of the figure is situated to the left on the economic dimension, as well as the GAL-TAN dimension. We may consider this to be a *left populist* cluster. Notice, however, that there is considerably more consensus about the economic dimension in this cluster than about the GAL-TAN dimension; the elongation of the ellipse along the x-axis is much smaller than it is along the y-axis.

This is different for the remaining clusters, where the main source of variation is in economic left-right positions and not the GAL-TAN dimension. Indeed, between the clusters there is considerable agreement between the economic left-right means. What distinguishes the clusters mostly is the location of the mean on the GAL-TAN dimension.

Consider first the cluster immediately to the right of the left populist cluster. This cluster is characterised by right-of-centre economic views. On the GAL-TAN dimension, however, the parties in the cluster tend to a mild GAL position. As a result, I call this cluster *centrist populist*. This is also justified by the relatively mild spread of parties around the cluster centroid.

The left and centrist populist clusters are distinctive from each other and from the remaining two clusters. The distinction between those clusters is blurred and mostly a reflection of the extremity of their positions on the GAL-TAN dimension. The cluster immediately above the centrist populist cluster consists of parties that are clearly on the TAN-side of politics but not extremely so. Thus, I call this the *soft TAN populism* cluster. The parties in the remaining cluster take quite strong TAN stances and may thus be called *hard TAN populists*. The distinction between the soft and hard TAN populism clusters is somewhat fluid, as is reflected in the size of the points at the border between both clusters. This size reflects the difficulty of assigning certain parties clearly to the hard or the soft TAN categories.

It should be noted that the soft and hard TAN populist varieties show little consensus in their economic views. They run the gamut from the far left to the far right. This highlights the difficulty of using labels such as “left” and “right” to understand the varieties of populism.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 2 shows the characteristics of the different clusters. The centroids clearly reveal the differences between the four clusters. We also observe that populist parties most likely are hard TAN (probability is 0.543). The least probable variant is centrist populism (probability is 0.107).

[Table 3 about here]

Where do the different populist parties from Table 1 fit? The answer can be found in Table 3. An interesting geographic pattern emerges. Leftist populist parties tend to occur in Southern Western Europe (86.4 percent). Centrist populist parties, on the other hand, tend to be concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe (78.6 percent). Soft TAN populist parties are also most common in Central and Eastern Europe (48 percent). Finally, two-thirds of the hard TAN populist parties are located in either Central and Eastern Europe or Western Europe.

Table 3 shows another interesting feature: mutations are relatively common. To be sure, 73.5 percent of the parties for which we have repeated measures remain of the same variation. This includes well-known examples such as the National Front in France, the North League in Italy and SYRIZA in Greece. But we observe varietal mutations among the remaining parties and some move out of the populist category altogether.

Considering the movers, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) transformed itself from a hard TAN (2006) into a soft TAN populist party (2010-14). The Danish People’s Party (DF) fluctuated between soft and hard TAN during the observation period. Go Italy/The People of Freedom (FI/PdL) moved from soft (2002-06) to hard TAN (2010) populism, before exiting abandoning its populism altogether (by my standards). The Hungarian Fidesz started as a hard TAN populist party (2002) prior to transforming into a soft TAN party (2006-10). By 2014, it was no longer a populist party by my criteria. Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) transformed from a soft TAN (2010) into a centrist populist party (2014). The Italian Five-Star Movement (M5S) could be considered a left populist party in 2014. By 2017, it had transformed itself into a centrist populist party. The True Finns (PS) moved from being a soft TAN to being a hard TAN party. The Slovakian Smer (Direction-Social Democracy) was a centrist populist party in 2002 and a left populist party in 2006. Subsequently, it no longer

was populist by my standards. Finally, over a period of eight years, the Slovenian National Party (SNS) transitioned from centrist to soft TAN to hard TAN populism.

4.2 Issue Profiles

All of the analysis so far has been based on the economic left-right and GAL-TAN ideological dimensions. To obtain a better sense of the views that represent the four varieties of populism, I now turn to considering specific issue positions that the parties take. Due to CHES limitations, we lose a number of the cases shown in Table 3: of the 137 cases only 47 remain for analysis.

For these cases, we consider 15 political issues: (1) decentralisation (High values indicate opposition to political decentralisation to regions and/or localities); (2) deregulation (high values mean support for deregulation); (3) the environment (high values mean the prioritisation of growth over environmental protection); (4) ethnic minorities (high values indicate opposition to extending rights to minorities); (5) European integration (high values indicate support for integration); (6) immigration (high values mean support for tough policies); (7) international security (high values indicate opposition to a country’s participation in peace keeping missions); (8) law and order (high values indicate support for tough crime policies); (9) lifestyle (high values indicate opposition to liberal policies toward homosexuality and other lifestyles); (10) multiculturalism (high values indicate an emphasis on assimilation); (11) redistribution (high values reflect opposition to redistributive policies); (12) religion (high values indicate that the party wants religion to play a large role in politics); (13) spending (high values indicate the prioritisation of tax cuts over spending); (14) state intervention (high values reflect opposition to state intervention in the economy); and (15) urban-rural (high values indicate the prioritisation of rural over urban interests). All positions have been normalised.

[Figure 2 about here]

For each variety of populism, we compute the mean position of the parties on a specific issues. Figure 2 shows the resulting issue profiles. The largest difference between the varieties of populism arises on the issue of redistribution, whereas the smallest difference is found for decentralisation. Moving in a counter-clockwise direction, we observe that

left populist parties stand apart in their positions on deregulation, the environment, ethnic minorities, immigration, law and order, lifestyle, multiculturalism, redistribution, religion, spending, and state intervention. They are also the most pro-environmental populists.

Centrist populist parties take the least progressive economic positions, favouring decentralisation and tax cuts, and opposing redistribution and state intervention. These parties are also most favourable disposed to European integration, although they are by no means Europhiles. They favour an active role in peacekeeping missions. Together with left populist parties, they tend to favour urban interests. Along with the TAN varieties of populism, the centrists tend to favour growth over the environment.

The distinctions in issue positions of soft and hard TAN parties are less obvious. Both groups tend to take conservative stances on ethnic minorities, immigration, and multiculturalism. They also hold quite similar economic positions, which are situated in between the left and centrist populist views. Differences emerge, however, on lifestyle issues and religion. Soft TAN populist parties tend to be more accepting of alternative lifestyles than hard TAN populists. They are also more skeptical about religion entering politics.

4.3 Variable Importance

Which issue positions matter the most for the classification of populist parties? To answer this question, I used the random forest machine learning algorithm (Breiman, 2001). The algorithm constructs a large number of decision trees, each using a subset of the issues. A major advantage of the approach is that it allows us to obtain measures of variable importance, which provide information about the relevance of each issue for the classification of a party as left, centrist, soft TAN, or hard TAN populist.

We implement the random forest by using 632-bootstrapping to distinguish between training and test sets (Efron & Tibshirani, 1997). We need the training set to learn the parameters of the decision trees, including the number of issues that should enter each tree (in our case, 2). Given the small sample size, using a bootstrap approach is preferable to other methods of splitting the original data into training and test sets (Molinario, Simon, & Pfeiffer, 2005). The 632-bootstrap is an improvement over the normal bootstrap in that it takes into account

the fact that a subset of cases will never make it into the training set.

The model performs well. It classifies 84.1 percent of the parties accurately. The chance level of correct classification for the 47 parties is 55.3 percent. The proportional reduction in error by using the random forest is 52.1 percent, which constitutes a strong improvement.

[Figure 3 about here]

Figure 3 shows the importance of each of the issues for classifying populist parties. We see that the five most important issues for the classification are lifestyle, religion, law and order, immigration, and urban-rural (in that order). The least important issues are redistribution, deregulation, EU, international security, and regions (in that order). This suggests that much of the classification hinges on issues that are typically associated with the GAL-TAN dimension of political conflict, whereas economic issues play a less central role.

5 Conclusions

Populism remains a central force in European politics. As long as it does, it behooves political scientists to stop treating populism as a monolithic movement and to start exploring the varieties of populism that shape the political debate. Over the past decade, considerable progress has been made in exploring within-differences among populist parties. Still, much remains to be learnt, not least because past studies have often focused on a few political parties and a single dimension of the political space.

The present paper is an attempt at delving more deeply and covering a broader range of parties. We find strong evidence of four varieties of populism: left, centrist, soft TAN, and hard TAN. We also find strong evidence that TAN-related issues are particularly potent in determining the type of populism.

The findings help us to understand the nature of populism in Europe, the geographic dispersion of various types, and the issues associated with different populist appeals. All of this is of considerable importance for understanding how populism shapes the political agenda throughout the European continent.

The paper’s relevance extends beyond Europe and populism, however. The machine learning approach

on which I relied can easily be used to explore global patterns of populism. It can also be used to explore party clusters beyond populism. It would be of considerable interest, for example, to study overlaps in populist- and non-populist left and right parties. This could shed light on the way in which populist discourse affects ideological proximate non-populist parties.

Of course, the populism typology derived here is empirical. The contours of populism may change as time passes, with new varieties emerging, others merging, and still others potentially dying out. Studying the varieties of populism thus should be a continuous project.

6 Appendix

6.1 Party Names

Abbreviation	Country	Name
ADR	LU	Alternative Democratic Reform Party
AfD	DE	Alternative for Germany
ANEL	GR	Independent Greeks
ANO	CZ	Action of Dissatisfied Citizens
Ataka	BG	Attack
BBZ	BG	Bulgaria Without Censorship
BZÖ	AT	Alliance for the Future of Austria
Cl-LP	HR	Croatia Labourists-Labour Party
DF	DK	Danish People’s Party
DK	LT	The Way of Courage
Dveri	RS	Doors
EKRE	EE	Conservative People’s Party
FdL-CN	IT	Brothers of Italy-National Center Right
FI	FR	Unbowed France
Fi/PdL	IT	Go Italy/The People of Freedom
Fidesz	HU	Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union
FN	BE	National Front
	FR	

FPÖ	AT	Freedom Party of Austria	SD	SE	Sweden Democrats
Fr	NO	Progress Party	SF	IE	We Ourselves
GERB	BG	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	Smer	SK	Direction-Social Democracy
HDSSB	HR	Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja	SNS	SI	Slovenian National Party
Jobbik	HU	Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary	SNS	SK	Slovak National Party
K	PL	Kukiz '15	SP	NL	Socialist Party
KPU	UA	Communist Party of Ukraine	SPD	CZ	Freedom and Direct Democracy Tomio Okamura
LAOS	GR	Popular Orthodox Rally	SR	SK	We Are Family!-Boris Kollar
LDD	BE	Libertarian, Direct, Democratic	SRP	PL	Self Defence of the Republic of Poland
Linke	DE	The Left	SSO	CZ	Party of Free Citizens
LN	IT	North League	SVP	CH	Swiss People's Party
LPF	NL	List Pim Fortuyn	SYRIZA	GR	Coalition of the Radical Left
LV	XK	Self-Determination Movement	TS	AT	Team Stronach
M5S	IT	Five Star Movement	TT	LT	Order and Justice
NDSV	BG	National Movement Simeon II	UKIP	UK	United Kingdom Independence Party
NFSB	BG	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	UPD	CZ	Dawn of Direct Democracy
OLaNO	SK	Ordinary People and Independent	VB	BE	Flemish Interest
P	ES	We Can	VV	CZ	Public Affairs
PiS	PL	Law and Justice	ZdLe	SI	United Left
PP-DD	RO	People's Party-Dan Diaconescu			
PRM	RO	Greater Romania Party			
PS	FI	Finns Party			
PS	UA	Right Sector			
PVV	NL	Party for Freedom			
PzP	ME	Movement for Changes			
RP	UA	Radical Party of Oleh Lyasko			
RZS	BG	Order, Lawfulness, and Justice			
SBB BiH	BA	Union for a Better Future of BiH			

6.2 Other Results

My analysis is based on the requirement that two sources agree that a party is populist. Obviously, one can relax this by requiring that only one source classifies the party as populist. How does this affect the results?

First, the number of populist parties now increases to 303 for the period 1999-2017. Some of the newly added parties, such as the Dutch Forum for Democracy, make sense as populist parties. For others such as the British Plaid Cymru, one might be a bit more reluctant to accept that they are indeed populist.⁵

[Figure 4 about here]

Second, the cluster solution now points to three varieties of populism: leftist, centrist, and TAN (see

⁵A full listing of the parties is available upon request from the author.

Figure 4). Thus, the distinction between soft and hard TAN parties has disappeared. Otherwise, however, the basic cluster results are confirmed.

Third, with the lenient classification criterion, the clusters appear to be far more heterogeneous than with the strict criterion. The centrist cluster, in particular, looks rather messy. Not only is there a lot of variance within this cluster on both the economic left-right and GAL-TAN dimensions, but some members seem closer to the centroids of the left and TAN clusters than they are to the centrist cluster.

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
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
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Figure 1: Populist Party Clusters Based on Ideology




Notes: Four clusters emerge. The centroids of the clusters indicate the cluster mean on the two ideological dimensions. The ellipsoids are drawn in such a way as to capture the variation across the dimensions. If the ellipsoid is elongated along the horizontal axis, this means that there is more heterogeneity in economic left-right placements than on the GAL-TAN dimension. By contrast, if the ellipsoid is elongated along the vertical axis, then heterogeneity primarily occurs along the GAL-TAN axis. The points in the graph indicate the different political parties. They are coloured depending on the cluster to which they belong. The size of each point indicates how much uncertainty there is in the placement of a party in a particular cluster. $N = 137$.

Figure 2: Mean Issue Positions Across Varieties of Populism




Notes: Radar chart with issue positions in alphabetic order, going counter-clockwise. The points indicate party means. They are connected through solid lines to obtain issue profiles. Black = left populism; red = centrist populism; green = soft TAN populism; and blue is hard TAN populism.

Figure 3: Importance of Variables for Classifying Populist Parties



Notes: Bar sizes reflect unscaled variable importance scores from the random forest algorithm. The longer the bar is, the more important an issue is for classifying populist parties.

Figure 4: Populist Party Clusters Based on a Lenient Classification



Notes: Four clusters emerge. The centroids of the clusters indicate the cluster mean on the two ideological dimensions. The ellipsoids are drawn in such a way as to capture the variation across the dimensions. If the ellipsoid is elongated along the horizontal axis, this means that there is more heterogeneity in economic left-right placements than on the GAL-TAN dimension. By contrast, if the ellipsoid is elongated along the vertical axis, then heterogeneity primarily occurs along the GAL-TAN axis. The points in the graph indicate the different political parties. They are coloured depending on the cluster to which they belong. The size of each point indicates how much uncertainty there is in the placement of a party in a particular cluster. $N = 303$.

Table 1: Populist Party Cases

COUNTRY	PARTY	YEARS	COUNTRY	PARTY	YEARS	COUNTRY	PARTY	YEARS
AL	—	—	FI	PS	2006-14	NO	Fr	2014
AT	BZÖ	2006-14	FR	FI	2017	PL	K	2017
	FPÖ	2002-14		FN	2002-17		PiS	2006-17
	TS	2014	GR	ANEL	2014-17		SRP	2002-10
BA	SBB BiH	2014		LAOS	2006-14	PT	—	—
BE	FN	2010		SYRIZA	2006-17	RO	PP-DD	2014
	LDD	2010	HR	CL-LP	2014		PRM	2002-10
	VB	2002-14		HDSSB	2014	RS	Dveri	2014
BG	Ataka	2006-14	HU	Fidesz	2002-10	SE	SD	2010-17
	BBZ	2014		Jobbik	2010-17	SI	SNS	2002-10
	GERB	2010-14	IE	SF	2002-14		ZdLe	2014
	NDSV	2002-10	IS	—	—	SK	OLaNO	2014
	NFSB	2014	IT	FdL-CN	2014-17		Smer	2002-06
	RZS	2010		FI/PdL	2002-10		SNS	2006-14
CH	SVP	2014		LN	2002-17		SR	2017
CY	—	—		M5S	2014-17	TR	—	—
CZ	ANO	2014-17	LT	DK	2014	UA	KPU	2014
	SPD	2017		TT	2006-14		PS	2014
	SSO	2014	LU	ADR	2014		RP	2014
	UPD	2014	LV	—	—	UK	UKIP	2014-17
DE	VV	2010	ME	PzP	2014	XK	LV	2014
	AfD	2014-17	MK	—	—			
	Linke	2002-17	MT	—	—			
DK	DF	2002-14	NL	LPF	2002			
EE	EKRE	2017	PVV	2006-17				
ES	P	2014-17	SP	2002-17				

Table 2: Cluster Characteristics

CLUSTER	CENTROIDS		
	PROB	ECONOMIC L/R	GAL-TAN
Centrist Populism	0.107	0.636	0.418
Left Populism	0.164	0.115	0.241
Soft TAN Populism	0.186	0.553	0.719
Hard TAN Populism	0.543	0.534	0.906

Notes: The economic left-right and GAL-TAN dimensions have been normalized.

Table 3: Cluster Memberships

		L	C	ST	HT			L	C	ST	HT
AT	BZÖ				06	LT	DK				14
	BZÖ			10-14			TT				06-14
	FPÖ				02-14	LU	ADR				14
	TS			14		ME	PzP		14		
BA	SBB BiH			14		NL	LPF		02		
BE	FN				10		PVV			06-17	
	LDD		10				SP	14-17			
	VB				02-14	NO	Fr			14	
BG	Ataka				06-14	PL	K				17
	BBZ			14			PiS				06-17
	GERB			10			SRP			02-10	
	GERB		14			RO	PP-DD				14
	NDSV		02-10				PRM				02-10
	NFSB			14		RS	Dveri				14
	RZS			10		SE	SD				10-17
CH	SVP				14	SI	SNS		02		
CZ	ANO		14-17				SNS			06	
	SSO		14				SNS				10
	UPD			14			ZdLe	14			
	VV		10			SK	OLaNO				14
DE	AfD				14-17		Smer		02		
	Linke	02-17					Smer	06			
DK	DF				02,10-14		SNS				02-14
	DF			06			SR				17
EE	EKRE				17	UA	KPU				14
ES	P	14-17					PS				14
FI	PS			06-10			RP				14
	PS				14	UK	UKIP				14-17
FR	FI	17				XK	LV	14			
	FN				02-17						
GR	ANEL				14-17						
	LAOS				06-14						
	SYRIZA	06-17									
HR	CL-LP	14									
	HDSSB				14						
HU	Fidesz				02						
	Fidesz			06-10							
	Jobbik				10-17						
IE	SF	02-14									
IT	FdL-CN				14-17						
	FI			02-06							
	FI				10						
	LN				02-17						
	M5S	14									
	M5S		17								

Notes: L = left populism; C = centrist populism; ST = soft TAN populism; HT = hard TAN populism. Cells indicate observation years or ranges.